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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
January 6, 1984 Conference 
List 5, Sheet 3 
No. 83-751 CFX Cert to CA9 
(Skopil, Pregerson, Ferguson) 
SEC, et al. (agency employees) 
v. 
~ ~ JERRY T. O'BRIEN, INC., et al. 
(SEC investigation targets) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: CA9 ruled that the SEC must notify targets 
of investigations when subpoenas are issued to third parties. 
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2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: In September 1980, the 
SEC issued a Formal Order of Investigation (FOI) directed at cer-
tain trading in mining company stock. An FOI empowers the staff vt 
to issue agency subpoenas, which can be en~rced only by ~urt. ----· 
Resps are a stock brokerage firm, one of its employees, and its 
accountant, who is also a customer of the brokerage firm. ~ 
named in the FOI and others were not. According to resps, the 
SEC staff vastly exceeded the scope of the FOI, investigating 
transactions in many other companies' stock and transactions that 
took place after the date of the FOI. In May and July 1981, the 
SEC subpoenaed resps. They generally declined to cooperate. 
\/Resps brought this action seeking damages ·under the Privacy Act 7 
and an injunction against further investigation on the ground 
that it was being conducted beyond the scope of the FOI. (The 
brokerage firm at first also sought to enjoin the accounting firm 
from complying with the subpoenas; later the accounting firm 
filed a cross-complaint against the SEC seeking the same relief 
as the brokerage firm sought.) 
In January 1982, the DC (ED wash, McNichols, J.) dismissed 
resps' equitable claims, holding that they had an adequate remedy 
---at law since they could contest the scope of the investigation if 
the SEC ever sought to enforce the subpoenas. The SEC did not 
immediately seek to enforce the subpoenas, but continued to sub-
poena third parties. Resps went back into DC and sought an order 




tempt to block compliance. In March 198 2, the DC refused to 
grant relief. 
It found that this Court's cases had created 
~~-rot protections for targets of investigations.~ 
when subpoenas are directed at them, they can resist enforcement 
by requiring the agency to show that (1) it has a legitimate pur-
pose for the investigation, ( 2) the inquiry is relevant to that 
purpose, (3) the agency does not possess the information sought, 
and (4) the agency has adhered to administrative steps required 
by law. United States v. Powell, 379 u.s. 48, 57-58 (1964). 
~' when third parties are summoned by subpoena, those af-
fected by a disclosure may seek to prevent compliance through 
permissive intervention in an enforcement action, or perhaps 
through an injunctive action. See Reisman v. Caplan, 375 U.S. 
440' 445 (1963). However, CA9 reasoned, unless targets know of -
subpoenas to third parties, the targets' "right to be investigat-
ed consistently with the Powell standards" as a practical matter 
will go unprotected. Third parties lack standing and motivation 
to protect that right. Notice to targets of third-party subpoe-
nas need not unduly burden the agency or courts, because compli-
ance with the Powell standards can be determined on the basis of 
affidavits. The court left open the possibility that in "special 
circumstances involving a serious threat to the integrity of the 
inve7.gation" notice might not be required. 
Five judges (Kennedy, Sneed, Ander son, 
sented from denial of rehearing en bane. 
I ' " • 
Poole, N_orris) dis-
The~ thought 





erroneous," and that refusal to rehear it "imposes an unnecessary 
burden on the Supreme Court." It said the decision threatened to 
compromise government investigations by most agencies because it 
would provide a new instrument for obstruction and delay, would 
chill employees and others from cooperating with investigators, 
and would force the government to articulate premature conclu-
sions about potential targets. 
3. CONTENTIONS: the notice require-
ment has no constitutional atutOry basis and is not suggest-
ed by Powell, which merely outlined the proof required of the 
agency in order to enforce its subpoenas. In fact, Congress has 
considered the issue and provided for notice of third-party sub-
poenas only in narrowly defined circumstances involving customers 
of financial institutions. See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 
1978, 12 u.s.c. §3401, 15 u.s.c. §78u{h). Notice is not needed 
because the alleged improprieties may be challenged when the 
agency institutes a subpoena enforcement or other action against 
the targets themselves. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 
517, 531 (1966) {target of tax investigation has no absolute 
right to intervene in subpoena-enforcement proceeding, any pro-
tectable interest can be asserted at trial). The decision below 
conflicts with every other CA to consider whether notice of 
third-party subpoenas is required, citing United States v. 
Schutterle, 586 F.2d 1201, 1204 {CA8 1978), Scarafiotti v. Shea, 
456 F.2d 1052, 1053 (CAlO 1972), and In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 8 
(CA2), cert. denied, 381 u.s. 950 {1965). The one court to con-
{ 
( 
sider the decision below has rejected it. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. 
SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828, 831-832 (SONY 1983). 
The SG also argues that CA9's decision has t seriously £ isrupt-
ed the SEC's investigations, and is almost certain to impair the 
~ 
operation of more than 100 federal programs that depend on simi-
lar subpoenas. The SEC is holding in abeyance many of its cur-
rent investigations in CA9. The Comm'n conducts up to 1,200 for-
mal investigations a year, and CA9 's dec is ion, if implemented 
nationwide, would require at least 15,000 notices a year. If 
notice were required to persons not named in FOis, more would be 
required. Requiring notice would increase opportunities for de-
struction of documents, intimidation of witnesses, and tailoring 
t~~l-
of testimony. It is the threat of such obstruction ~ underlies the 
secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Moreover, delay will result 
because targets will encourage witnesses not to comply, forcing 
many more enforcement proceedings than otherwise would be neces-
sary. The ruling below also will create uncertainty since the 
court did not define the term "target," a term not used by the 
SEC itself. 
Resps have filed two briefs in response. They essentially 
repeat the arguments of the panel opinion below, noting in addi-
tion that the government is wrong that targets have an adequate 
remedy at trial. This Court has never held the evidence wrong-
fully obtained can be suppressed in a civil proceeding, which is 
the route the SEC frequently selects. Resps also argue that 
there is no conflict with other CAs. Schutterle merely held that 




poenas. In Scarafiotti, the target sought notice of any inter-
view of a witness, not just subpoenas: moreover, the action was 
one for mandamus, and the court merely found that the duty sought 
to be imposed was not so "plainly defined" as to be free from 
doubt. In Cole, the taxpayer already knew of the summons on the 
bank, so the court naturally held that no notice was required. 
Finally, in PepsiCo the plaintiff was not challenging the SEC's 
investigation, but merely sought notice to ensure compliance with 
Powell. 
Resps also argue that the litany of horribles recited by the 
government amount to no more than agency inconvenience, which 
should not block the attainment of rights conferred by this Court 
and Congress. The same fears were expressed by the SEC before 
Congress prior to passage of the Right to Financial Privacy Act. 
SEC investigations are not like grand jury investigations, which 
operate independently of, and as a check on, the prosecutor, and 
involve only criminal violations. SEC investigations are more 
like a one-sided civil discovery overseen by the courts. 
4. DISCUSSION: Resps accurately characterize 
Schutterle and Scaraf iotti, but there does appear to be a con-
flict with CA2's opinion in Cole. The court there held that tax-
payers were not entitled to notice of a summons on their bank 
since the taxpayers did not own the material requested, and 
therefore had no standing to object. CA2 did not, however, ex-
pressly consider the right found by CA9 to be investigated only 
pursuant to the Powell standards. The DC opinion in PepsiCo, 







below i (a1 though the -eou r t U19r; )_ did suggest that such relief 
could be appropriate in individual case:). Judge Sofaer cited 
opinions of this Court that suggest that government investiga-
tions are not to be burdened with trial-type procedures, see 
Hannah v. Larche, 363 u.s. 420, 445-448 (1960) (approving Civil 
Rights Comm'n investigatory rules), and that issuance of subpoe-
nas to third parties does not implicate the rights of the target 
of the investigation, United States v. Miller, 425 u.s. 435, 444 
(1976) (denying motion to suppress records obtained from third 
party) • 
Regardless of whether all the dire consequences listed by the 
government will in fact flow from CA9's decision--and resps do 
not effectively rebut the SG's claims--it seems obvious that the k{~ 
~---- r 
decision imposes a substantial burden on the government. At 
~ ----------------~-----------
least in CA9, the SEC and perhaps other agencies will have to 
create a new procedure to identify "targets," and mail hundreds 
t... 
or thousands of notices a year. Especially since the new re-
""""' ----------------quirement is intended to effectuate rights assertedly created by 
the opinions of this Court, it would seem that it should be im-
posed, if at all, by this Court and not merely by one Circuit. 
Therefore, I do not see any alternative to taking this case. Be-
cause of the burden on the government, · it ·.·. probably is not the 
kind of matter that can be left for development in the lower 
courts. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend a GRANT. 
There are two responses. 
December 18, 1983 ~Neuhaus Opin in petn 
January 6, 1984 
Court ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .... · .............. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-751 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. JERRY T. O'BRIEN, INC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1984] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. ?t II (,P71 ~ 
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or / 
"Commission") has statutory authority to conduct _QOnpublic ~"""' " 
investigations into possible violations of the securities laws bul- .. - -. ~p-- ..... 7 
ana, in The course thereof, to iSsue subpoenas to obtain rele- ~ !-0---
~nt information. The ques Ion be ore us Is w ether the ~
CommiSSion must notify the "targgt" of such an investigation -: ::;JJ,. .. 
when it issues a subpoena to a Uilrd party. ~~ { ~ 
--------- I 
This case represents o e shard fa prolonged investigation 
by the SEC into the affairs espondent Harry F. Magnu-
son and persons and firms with whom he has dealt. The in-
vestigation began in 1980, when the Commission's staff re-
ported to the Commission that information in their possession 
tended to show that Magnuson and others had been trading 
in the stock of specified mining companies in a manner vio-
lative of the registration, reporting, and antifraud provisions 
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. In response, the Commission issued a Formal 
Order of Investigation 1 authorizing employees of its Seattle 
1 A Formal Order of Investigation is issued by the Commission only after 
its staff has conducted a preliminary inquiry, in the course of which 
"no process is issued [nor] testimony compelled." 17 CFR § 202.5 (1983). 





2 SEC v. JERRY T. O'BRIEN, INC. 
Regional Office to initiate a "private investigation" into the 
transactions in question and, if necessary, to subpoena testi-
mony and documents "deemed relevant or material to the in-
quiry." Complaint, Exhibit A at 2-3. 
Acting on that authority, members of the Commission staff 
subpoenaed financial records in the possession of res ondent 
Jerry . r1en, Inc. (0' rien), a roker- ea er firm, and 
respondent Pennaluna & Co. (Pennaluna). O'Brien vo~­
tari y complied, but Pennaluna refuse to disgorge t!w re-
quested materials. Soon thereafter, in response to several 
inq~rien's counsel, a member of the SEC staff in-
formed O'Brien that _li was a "subject" of the investigation. 
O'Brien, Pennaluna, and their respective owners 2 
promptly filed a suit in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Washington, seeking to enjoin the Commission's 
investigation and to prevent Magnuson from complying with 
subpoenas that had been issued to him. 3 Magnuson filed a 
cross-claim, also seeking to block portions o_f.Jhe investiga-
tion. O'Brien then filed motions seeking authority to depose 
the Commission's officers and to conduct expedited discovery 
into the Commission's files. 4 
tigation and to establish limits within which the staff may resort to compul-
sory process. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F. 2d 1018, 1023 
(CADC 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1071 (1979). 
2 The relationships between Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., Pennaluna & Co., 
and their individual owners are not fully eludicated by the papers before 
us. Because, for the purposes of this litigation, the interests of all of these 
respondents are identical, hereinafter they will be referred to collectively 
as O'Brien, except when. divergence in their treatment by the courts below 
requires that they be differentiated. 
8 The gravamen of O'Brien's suit was that the SEC's Formal Order of 
Investigation was defective, that the the investigation did not have a valid 
purpose, that the Commission should have afforded the subjects of the in-
vestigation a chance to comment upon it, that the issues around which the 
case revolved had been litigated and settled in another proceeding in 1975, 
and that the constitutional, statutory, and common-law privacy rights of 
the subjects of the inquiry were being abridged. Complaint 3-16. 
'During the pendency of the suit, the Commission, at the District 
83-751-0PINION 
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The District Court denied respondents' discovery motions 
and soon thereafter disimsse t e1r c a1ms or injunctive re-
lief. Jerry T. O'Brien v. SEC, No. C-81-546 (ED Wash., 
Jan 20, 1982). The principal ground for the court's decision 
was that respondents would have a full opportunity to assert 
their objections to the basis and scope of the SEC's investi-
gation if and when the Commission instituted a subpoena en-
forcement action. The court did, however, rule that the 
Commission's outstanding subpoenas 5 met the requirements 
outlined in United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964), for 
determining whether an administrative summons is judicially 
enforceable. Specifically, the District Court held that the 
Commission had a legitimate purpose in issuing the subpoe-
nas, that the requested information was relevant and was not 
already in the Commission's possession, and that the issu-
ance of the subpoenas comported with pertinent procedural 
requirements. 
Following the District Court's decision, the SEC issued 
several sub oenas to third parties. In response, agnuson 
and O'Brien renewed err request to the District Court for 
injunctive relief, accompanying the request with a motion, 
pursuant to Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, for a stay pending appeal. For the first time, respond-
ents expressly sought notice of the subpoenas issued by the 
Co~ parties. easomng s on ents 
la~ enge voluntary compliance with sub-
poenas by third parties, and that, in any subsequent proceed-
ing brought by the SEC, respondents could move to suppress 
evidence the Commission had obtained from third parties 
through abusive subpoenas, the District Court denied the re-
Court's request, refrained from seeking enforcement of its outstanding 
subpoenas. 
• Because no subpoenas were then outstanding against Jerry T. 
O'Brien, Inc. or O'Brien in his personal capacity, the District Court 
declined to determine whether the Commission had complied with the 




4 SEC v. JERRY T. O'BRIEN, INC. 
quested relief. Jerry T. O'Brien v. SEC, Civ. No. C-81-546 
(ED Wash., March 25, 1982).6 • • 
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed t e IS ric Court s derua o InJunctive re Ie with 
re~d to the su oenas drrecte at res ondents emse ves, 
agreeing with the lower court that respondents ad an a e-
quate remedy at law for challenging those subpoenas. 7 704 
F. 2d 1065, 1066-1067 (CA9 1983). However, the Court of 
A~ls reve ed the District Court's denial of respondents' 
request £ notice o) subpoenas issued to third parties. In 
the Co . ppeals' view, "targets" of SEC investigations 
"have a right to be investigated consistently with the Powell 
standards." Id., at 1068. To enable targets to enforce this 
· right, the court held that they must be notified of subpoenas 
issued to others. I d., at 1069. 
The Court of Appeals .denied the Commission's request for 
rehearing and rejected its suggestion for rehearing en bane. 
719 F. 2d 300 (CA9 1983). Judge Kennedy, joined by four 
other judges, dissented from the rejection, arguing that the 
panel decision was unprecedented and threatened the ability 
of the SEC and other agencies to conduct nonpublic investi-
gations into possible violations of federal law. Ibid. 
5 The District Court granted respondents a brief stay to enable them to 
petition the Court of Appeals for a longer stay pending disposition of the 
appeal, but the Court of Appeals refused to enjoin the Commission from 
proceeding with its investigation. The SEC then filed various subpoena 
enforcement actions. The Commission has prevailed in at least one of 
those suits, SEC v. Magnuson, No. 82-1178-Z (D Mass., Aug. 11, 1982) 
(enforcing subpoenas to Magnuson family members); another is still pend-
ing, see SEC v. Magnuson, et al., No. C-82-282-RJM (ED Wash., under 
submission). Cf. Magnuson v. SEC, No. 82-2042 (D Idaho, July 27, 1982) 
(rejecting motion by Magnuson and his wife to quash subpoenas directed to 
a financial institution). 
7 Because respondents have not cross-petitioned, the validity of the 
Court of Appeals' ruling on the merits of respondents' claims for injunctive 
relief is not before us. 
83-751-0PINION 
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We granted certiorari because of the importance e 
issue presented: --U.S.-- (1984). We now everse 
II 
Congress has vested the SEC with broad authority to con-
duct investigations into possible violations of the federal se-
curities laws and to demand production of evidence relevant 
to such investigations. E. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 77s(b), 78u(a}-
(b). 8 Subpoenas issued by the Commission are not self-
enforcing, and the recipients thereof are not subject to pen-
alty for refusal to obey. But the Commission is authorized 
to bring suit in federal court to compel compliance with its 
process. E. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 77v(b), 78u(c).9 
No provision in the complex of statutes governing the ?-t...ZJ 
SEC'S mves~1ga~ e r ss y o ges e ommission 
to notify the "tar et" of an investigation when it issues a sub-
poena to a third party. If such an obligation is to be imposed 
on the Commission, therefore, it must be derived from one of 
three sources: a constitutional provision; an understanding on 
the part of Congress, inferrable from the structure of the se-
curities laws, regarding how the SEC should conduct its in-
quiries; or the general standards governing judicial enforce-
ment of administrative subpoenas enunciated in United 
States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964), and its progeny. 
Examination of these three potential bases for the Court of 
8 The provisions cited in the text are the pertinent provisions of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, respectively. 
In conducting the investigation that gives rise to this case, the Commission 
relied solely on those acts. Many other statutes administered by the SEC 
contain similar provisions. See 15 U. S. C. § 79r (Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935); 15 U. S. C. § 77uuu(a) (Trust Indenture Act of 
1939); 15 U. S. C. §§ 80a-40(a), (b) (Investment Company Act of 1940); 15 
U. S. C. §§ 80b-9(a), (b) (Investment Advisors Act of 1940). 
• The analogous enforcement provisions for the other statutes adminis-
tered by the Commission are: 15 U. S. C. § 79r(d) (Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935); 15 U. S. C. § 77uuu(a) (Trust Indenture Act of 
1939); 15 U. S. C. §§ 80a-40(c) (Investment Company Act of 1940); 15 




6 SEC v. JERRY T. O'BRIEN, INC. 
Appeals' ruling leaves us unpersuaded that the notice re-
quirement fashioned by that court is warranted. 
A 
Our prior cases foreclose an constitutional argument re-
spondents might make m defense of t e JU gmen below. 
The opinion of the Court in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420 
(1960), leaves no doubt that neither the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment nor the Coruroiitatlon Clause ' of the 
Sixth Amendment is offended when a federal administrative 
ag_ency, without not' ng a person un er mvestiga 10n, uses 
itsSUbpoena power to gather evidence adverse to him. The 
Due Process --erause 1s not 1mplicatea under such circum-
stances because an administrative investigation adjudicates 
no legal rights, id., at 440-443, and the Confrontation Clause 
does not come into play until the initiation of criminal pro-
ceedings, id., at 440, n. 16. These principles plainly cover an 
inquiry by the SEC into possible violations of the securities 
laws. 
It is also settled that a person inculpated by materials 
sought by a subpoena issued to a third party cannot seek 
shelter in the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The rationale of this doctrine is that the Constitution 
proscribes only compelled self-incrimination, and, whatever 
may be the position of the person to whom a subpoena is di-
rected, 10 the subpoena surely does not "compel" anyone else 
to be a witness against himself. Fisher v. United States, 425 
U. S. 391, 397 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 
328-329 (1973). If the "target" of an investigation by the 1 
SEC has no Fifth Amendnle'iitright to challenge enforcement 
of a subpoena directed at a third party, he clearly can assert 
no derivative right to notice when the Commission issues 
such a subpoena. 
Finally, respondents cannot invoke the Fourth Amend-
ment in support of the Court of Appeals' decision. It is es-
1"Cf. United States v. Doe,- U.S.-,- (1984) (slip op. 5-8). 
83-751-0PINION 
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tablished that, when a person communicates information to a 
third party even on the understanding that the communica-
tion is confidential, he cannot object if the third party con-
veys that information or records thereof to law enforcement 
authorities. United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 
(1976). Relying on that principle, the Court has held that a 
customer of a bank cannot challenge on Fourth Amendment 
grounds the admission into evidence in a criminal prosecution 
of financial records obtained by the Government from his 
bank pursuant to allegedly defective subpoenas, despite the 
fact that he was given no notice of the subpoenas. I d., at 
443, n. 5. 11 See also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 
517, 522 (1971) (Internal Revenue summons directed to third 
party does not trench upon any interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment). 12 These rulings disable respondents 
from arguing that notice of subpoenas issued to third parties 
is necessary to allow a target to prevent an unconstitutional 
search or seizure of his papers. 
B 
The language and structure of the statutes administered by 
the CommissiOn or res on en s no greater aid. The pro-
visions vesting the SE with the power o Issue and seek en-
forcement of subpoenas are expansive. For example, sec-
tion 19(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 empowers the SEC to 
conduct investigations "which, in the opinion of the Commis-
sion, are necessary and proper for the enforcement" of the 
act and to "require the production of any books, papers, or 
other documents which the Commission deems relevant or 
11 It should be noted that any Fourth Amendment claims that might be 
asserted by respondents are substantially weaker than those of the bank 
customer in Miller because .respondents, unlike the customer, cannot argue 
that the subpoena recipients were required by law to keep the records in 
question. Cf. 425 U. S., at 455-456 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
12 Cf. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc.,- U.S.-,- (1984) (slip op. 
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material to the inquiry." 15 U. S. C. § 77s(b). Similarly, 
§§ 21(a) and 21(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 au-
thorize the Commission to "make such investigations as it 
deems necessary to determine whether any person has vio-
lated, is violating, or is about to violate any provisions of this 
title [or] the rules or regulations thereunder" and to demand 
to see any papers "the Commission deems relevant or mate-
rial to the inquiry." 15 U. S. C. § 78u(a), (b). 13 
More generally, both statutes vest the SEC with "power to 
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or ap-
propriate to implement their provisions .... " 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 77s(a), 78w(a)(1). Relying on this authority, the SEC has 
promulgated a variety of rules governing its ·investigations, 
one of which provides that, "[u]nless otherwise ordered by 
the Commission, all formal investigative proceedings shall be 
non-public." 17 CFR § 203. 5. In other words, the Commis-
sion has formally adopted the policy of not routinely inform-
ing anyone, including targets, of the existence and progress 
of its investigations. 14 To our knowledge, Congress has 
never questioned this exercise by the Commission o 1ts stat-
utory power. , m a o er con ext, we ave 11e10that 
rule:making authority comparable to that enjoyed by the 
SEC is broad enough to empower an agency to "establish 
standards for determining whether to conduct an investiga-
tion publicly or in private." FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U. S. 
279, 292 (1965). 
It appears, in short, that Congress intended to vest the 
SEC with considerable discretion in determining when and 
how to investigate possible violations of the statutes adminis-
13 The other statutes administered by the SEC contain similarly broad 
delegations of investigatory power. See the provisions cited in n. 8, 
supra. 
14 In practice, virtually all investigations conducted by the Commission 
are nonpublic. See 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1955 (2d ed. 1961); 
SEC, Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and 
Practices 18 (1972). 
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tered by the Commission. We discern no evidence that Con-
gress wished or expected that the Commission would adopt 
any particular procedures for notifying "targets" of investiga-
tions when it sought information from third parties. 
The inference that the relief sought by respondents is not 
necessary to give effect to Congressional intent is reinforced 
by the fact that, in one special context, Congress has imposed 
on the Commission an obligation to notify persons directly af-
fected by its subpoenas. In 1978, in response to this Court's 
decision in United States v. Miller, supra, 15 Congress enacted 
the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U. S. C. § 3401 et seq. 
That statute accords customers of banks and similar financial 
institutions certain r.ights to be notified of and to challenge in 
court administrative subpoenas of financial records in the 
possession of the banks. The most salient feature of the act 
is the narrow scope of the entitlements it creates. Thus, it 
carefully limits the kinds of customers to whom it applies, 
§ 3401(4), (5), and the types of records they may seek to pro-
tect, § 3401(2). A customer's ability to challenge a subpoena 
is cabined by strict procedural requirements. For example, 
he must assert his claim within a short period of time, 
§ 3410(a), and cannot appeal an adver.se determination until 
the Government has completed its investigation, § 3410(d). ) 
Perhaps most importantly, the statute is drafted in a fashion 
that minimizes the risk that customers' objections to subpoe-
nas will delay or frustrate agency investigations. Thus, a · 
court presented with such a challenge is required to rule upon 
it within seven days of the Government's response, § 3410(b), 
and the pertinent statutes of limitations are tolled while the 
claim is pending, § 3419. Since 1980, the SEC has been sub-
ject to the constraints of the Right to Financial Privacy Act. 
15 U. S. C. § 78u(h)(1). When it made the statute applicable 
15 See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1383, p. 34 (1978) (the purpose of the statute is 
to fill the gap left by the ruling in Miller that a bank customer has "no 
standing under the Constitution to contest Government access to financial 
records"). 
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to the SEC, however, Congress empowered the Commission 
in prescribed circumstances to seek ex parte orders authoriz-
ing it to delay notifying bank customers when it subpoenas 
information about them, thereby further curtailing the ability 
of persons under investigation to impede the agency's inqui-
ries. 15 U. S. C. § 78u(h)(2). 
Considerable insight into the legislators' conception of the 
scope of the SEC's investigatory power can be gleaned from 
the foregoing developments. We know that Congress re-
cently had occasion to consider the authority of the SEC and 
other agencies to issue and enforce administrative subpoenas 
without notifying the persons whose affairs may be exposed 
thereby. In response, Congress enacted a set of carefully 
tailored limitations on the agencies' power, designed "to 
strike a balance between customers' right of privacy and the 
need of law enforcement agencies to obtain financial records 
pursuant to legitimate investigations." H. R. Rep. No. 
9&-1383, p. 33 (1978). The manner in which Congress dealt 
with this problem teaches us two things. First, it seems ap-
parent that Congress assumed that the SEC was not and 
would not be subject to a general obligation to notify "tar-
gets" of its investigations whenever it issued adminstrative \ 
subpoenas. 16 • Second, the complexity and subtlety of the pro-
cedures embodied in the Right to Financial Privacy Act sug-
f 
gests that Congress would firid trouBling the crude and un-
qualified notification requirement orde'red by the Court of 
Appeals. 17 " _ ' -
16 In this regard, it is noteworthy that the pertinent Congressional com-
mittees expressed their desire that the judiciary not supplement the reme-
dies created by the statute with any implied causes of action. See H. R. 
Rep. No. 96-1321 (Pt. 1), p. 10 (1980); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1383, pp. 54, 56, 
225, 230 (1978). 
17 The significance of these two lessons is not that they illuminate Con-
gress' intent when it enacted or when it subsequently amended the crucial 
provisions vesting the Commission with investigatory authority, see 
supra, at-. Rather, they inform our determination whether adoption 
of the remedy proposed by respondents would comport with or disrupt the 
83-751-0PINION 
SEC v. JERRY T. O'BRIEN, INC. 11 
c 
The last of the three potential footings for the remedy 
sought by respondents is some other entitlement that would 
be effectuated thereby. Respondents seek to derive such an 
entitlement from a combination of our prior decisions. Dis-
tilled, their argument is as follows: A subpoena issued by the 
SEC must comport with the standards set forth in our deci-
sion in United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 57-58 (1964). 18 
system of statutes governing the issuance and trading of securities, as that 
system has been modified and refined by Congress in the years since 1933. 
In this regard, our inquiry is analogous to the kind of analysis contem-
plated by the third of the four factors we consider when deciding whether 
it would appropriate to create a private right of action as an adjunct to a 
right created by statute: "[l]s it consistent with the underlying purposes of 
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy ... ?" See, e. g., Cannon 
v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703-708(1979); Cart v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66, 78 (1975). 
18 The holding of Powell was that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
need not demonstrate probable cause in order to secure judicial enforce-
ment of a summons issued pursuant to § 7602 of the Internal Revenue 
Code. The Court then went on to sketch the requirements that the Com-
missioner would be obliged to satisfy: 
"He must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a le-
gitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, that 
the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's posses-
sion, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been fol-
lowed. . . . [A] court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an 
abuse would take place if the summons had been issued for an improper 
purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle 
a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of 
the particular investigation." 379 U. S., at 57--58 (footnote omitted); see 
United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298, 313-314 (1978). 
Some lower courts have held or assumed that the SEC must satisfy these 
standards in order to obtain enforcement of its subpoenas. E. g., SEC v. 
ESM Government Securities, Inc., 645 F. 2d 310, 313-314 (CA5 1981). 
But cf. In re EEOC, 709 F. 2d 392, 398, n. 2 (CA5 1983). Respondents 
contend that the obligation of an agency to follow pertinent "administrative 
steps" means in this context that any subpoena issued under the auspices of 
the SEC must come within the purview of a Formal Order of Investigation, 
see n. 1, supra. Because of the manner in which we dispose of this case, 
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Not only the recipient of an SEC subpoena, but also any per-
son who would be affected by compliance therewith, has a 
substantive right, under Powell, to insist that those stand-
ards are met. A target of an SEC investigation may assert 
the foregoing right in two ways. First, relying on Reisman 
v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440, 445 (1964), and Donaldson v. 
United States, 400 U. S., at 529,'9 the target may seek per-
missive intervention in an enforcement action brought by the 
Commission against the subpoena recipient. Second, if the 
recipient of the subpoena threatens voluntarily to turn over 
the requested information, the target "might restrain compli-
ance" by the recipient, thereby forcing the Commission to in-
stitute an enforcement suit. See Re~sman v. Caplin, 375 
U. S., at 450. A target can avail himself of these options 
only if he is aware of the existence of subpoenas directed at 
others. To ensure that ignorance does not prevent a target 
from asserting his rights, respondents conclude, the Copimis-
sion must notify him when it issues a subpoena to a third 
party. 
There are several tenuous links in respondents' argument. 
Especially debatable are the proposition that a target has a 
substantive right to be investigated in a manner consistent 
with the Powell standards and the assertion that a target 
may obtain a restraining order preventing voluntary compli-
ance by a third party with an administrative subpoena. Cer-
tainly we have never before expressly so held. For the 
we have no occasion to pass upon respondents' characterization or applica-
tion of our decision in Powell. 
'"In Reisman, the Court indicated in dictum that "both parties sum-
moned [under§ 7602] and those affected by a disclosure may appear or in-
tervene before the District Court and challenge the summons by asserting 
their constitutional or other claims." 375 U. S., at 445; see id., at 449. 
Our decision in Donaldson made clear that the right of a third party to 
intervene in an enforcement action "is permissive only and is not manda-
tory," 400 U. S., at 529, and that determination whether intervention 
should be granted in a particular case requires "[t]he usual process of bal-
ancing opposing equities," id., at 530. 
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present, however, we may assume arguendo that a target en-
joys each of the substantive and procedural rights identified 
by respondents. Nevertheless, we conclude that it would be 
inappropriate to elaborate upon those entitlements by man-
dating notification of targets whenever the Commission is-
sues subpoenas. 
Two considerations underlie our decision on this issue. 
F. , a ministration o e notice reqmrement a voca ed by 
r spondents wouldl'ie highly Burdensome Tor ooththe Com-
mission and tlie courts. •r:ne most obvious difficulty would 
involve identification of the persons and organizations that 
should be considered "targets" of investigations. 20 The SEC 
often undertakes investigations into suspicious securities 
transactions without any knowledge of which of the parties 
involved may have violated the law. 21 To notify all potential 
wrongdoers in such a situation of the issuance of each sub-
poena would be virtually impossible. The Commission 
would thus be obliged to determine the point at which enough 
evidence had been assembled to focus suspicion on a manage-
able subset of the participants in the transaction, thereby 
lending them the status of "targets" and entitling them to no-
tice of the outstanding subpoenas directed at others. The 
complexity of that task is apparent. Even in cases in which 
the Commission could identify with reasonable ease the prin-
cipal targets of its inquiry, another problem would arise. In 
such circumstances, a person not considered a target by the 
Commission could contend that he deserved that status and 
therefore should be given notice of subpoenas issued to oth-
ers. To assess such a claim, a district court would be obliged 
21) Neither the pertinent statutes nor the Commission's regulations define 
or even use the term "target," so either the Commission or the courts 
would be obliged at the outset to develop a working definition of the term. 
21 So, for example, the Commission is sometimes called upon to investi-
gate unusually active trading in the stock of a company during the period 
immediately preceding a tender offer for that stock. In such a case, the 
Commission may have no idea which (if any) of the thousands of purchasers 
was given improper access to inside information. 
' . 
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to conduct some kind of hearing to determine the scope and 
thrust of the ongoing investigation. 22 Implementation of this 
new remedy would drain the resources of the judiciary as 
w~he Commission. 23 
~~d, the imposition of a notice requirement on the SEC 
would substantially increase the ability of persons who have 
something to 1 e to impe e eg~tima e mves 1ga 1ons y the 
Comm1ss1on. target given notice of every subpoena is-
sued to third parties would be able to discourage the recipi-
ents from complying, and then further delay disclosure of 
damaging information by seeking intervention in all enforce-
ment actions brought by the Commission. More seriously, 
the understanding of the progress of an SEC inquiry that 
would flow from knowledge of which persons had received 
subpoenas would enable an unscrupulous target to destroy or 
alter documents, intimidate witnesses, or transfer securities 
or funds so that they could not be reached by the Govern-
ment. 24 Especially in the context of securities regulation, 
where speed in locating and halting violations of the law is so 
important, we would be loathe to place such potent weapons 
22 Cf. Jerry T. O'Brien v. SEC, 704 F. 2d 1065, 1069 (CA9 1983) ("The 
target's right could be asserted . . . by other appropriate district court 
proceedings"). 
28 It would also have the effect of laying bare the state of Commission's 
knowledge and intentions midway through investigations. For the rea-
sons sketched below, such exposure could significantly hamper the Com-
mission's efforts to police violations of the securities laws. 
usee PepsiCo. v. SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828,832 (SDNY 1983) (To impose a 
notification requirement on the SEC "would necessarily permit all tar-
gets-and presumably all potential targets-effectively to monitor the 
course and conduct of agency investigations. Experience and common 
sense should establish that such a power would be greatly abused .... "); 
cf. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 239 (1978) (citing 
the risk that employers or unions would attempt to "coerce or intimidate 
employees and others who have given statements" as a reason for holding 
exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act statements 
given by witnesses to the NLRB). 
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in the hands of persons with a desire to keep the Commission 
at bay. 
We aclmowledge that our ruling may have the effect in I 
practice of preventing some persons under investigation by 
the SEC from asserting objections to subpoenas issued by 
the Commission to third parties for improper reasons. How-
ever, to accept respondents' proposal ''would unwarrantedly 
cast doubt upon and stultify the [Commission's] every inves-
tigatory move," Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 
531. Particularly in view of Congress' manifest disinclina-
tion to require the Commission to notify targets whenever it 
seeks information from others, see supra, at --, we refuse 
so to curb the Commission's exercise of its statutory power. 25 
III 
Nothing in this opinion should be construed to imply that it 
would be improper for the SEC to inform a target that it has 
issued a subpoena to someone else. But, for the reasons in-
dicated above, we decline to curtail the Commission's dis re- lJ7< 
tion to determine w en sue n Ice wou d e appr2Jll"iate and 
wnen It would not. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
Courtof Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
211 Cf. United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,- U.S.-,- (1984) 
("'absent unambiguous directions from Congress,'" the summons power 
conferred on the Internal Revenue Service by statute should not be re-
stricted by the courts) (quoting United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141, 
150 (1975)). 
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